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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)
)
)
Petitioner/Appellant, )
)
v.
)
)
JEROME COUNTY, a Political Subdivision )
of the State ofIdaho,
)
)
Respondent.
)
)
93 GOLF RANCH, LLC,
)
)
Intervenor.
)
)
GILTNER DAIRY, LLC, an Idaho
Limited Liability Company,

Supreme Court Nos. 36528-2009
Jerome County case No. CV-08-1269
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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Jerome County

The Honorable John K. Butler, District Judge, Presiding

Terrence R. White, ISB #1351
Davis F. Vander Velde, ISB # 7314
WI-IITE PERTERSON GIGRA Y
ROSSMAN NYE & NICHOLS, P.A.
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Nampa, ID 83687
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
Giltner Dairy, LLC

Michael J. Seib, ISB # 5258
JEROME COUNTY
PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
233 West Main
Jerome, ID83338
Attorney for Respondent

Gary D. Slette
ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC
134 Third Avenue East
P.O. Box 1906
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1906
Attorney for intervenor 93 Golf Ranch, LLC
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner!Appellant ("Giltner") sought judicial review of a zoning decision by the
Jerome County Board of Commissioners ("Board") pursuant to Idaho Code Section 311506. Intervenor 93 Golf Ranch, LLC's brought a motion to dismiss Giltner's petition,
which was granted by the district court on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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ARGUMENT
Giltner raises only two issues on appeal.

Jerome County addresses only the

second issue (whether I.C. § 31-1506 applies to zoning decision by a board of county
commissioners), as it is dispositive of the case.
Giltner seeks judicial review of a zoning decision pursuant to Idaho Code Section
31-1506; and does so after first recognizing that the "judicial review provisions of the
LLUPA are no longer available for review of a board of commissioners' decision on an
application for rezone." (Appellant's Brief, at 9; referencing Burns Holdings, LLC v.

Madison County Board of County Commissioners, 147 Idaho 660, 21 P.3d 646 (2009)
and Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 181 P.3d 1238 (2008».
Giltner also states that "[tJhe judicial review provision of the LLUPA is found in I.C. §

67-6521." (Appellant's Brief, at 7). This statement however, is not necessarily correct in
that 67-6521 is not the only judicial review provision in LLUPA. Idaho Code Section 676519(4) and 67-6520 also provide judicial review procedures for decisions on pennits,
both essentially identical to 67-6521.

Section 67-6535(c) is also a "judicial-review

provision" in that it provides instruction to courts when engaged in such review.
Furthermore, section 67-6507 allows a planning, zoning or planning and zoning
commission "to seek judicial process" when necessary.

Section 67-651 I (d) gives a

property owner standing in court to enforce a certain provision of that statute, and 676533(d) discusses the authority of a court to issue temporary restraining orders in matters
involved with that section. Finally, and at least along the lines of dispute resolution, 676510 provides for mediation procedures for land use matters.

2

There are two points being made here for consideration. The first is that all these
judicial mentioning provisions of LLUPA show it to have many more provisions relating
to judicial review than just simply section 67 -6521 (as Giltner at least implies). Second
(and much more importantly), the specific referencing of the various judicial processes in
these several sections shows that the legislature had judicial review/process in mind and
inserted it throughout LLUPA, but only in those provisions where it specifically intended.
Of real significance is the fact that no less than three times, in three different statutes,
does the legislature specifically limit judicial review per the APA to permit decisions
only.J
The remaining "judicial-process" sections of LLUPA (cited above) reference
other kinds of processes that may not pertain to APA review, but nonetheless, still do not
expand past the "permit-issuance" limitations set by the three statutes noted in the above
footnote.

The fact that these other sections do not reference APA review, but do

reference some form of judicial process, may be all the more significant in showing that
the legislature wanted to limit AP A review to only those areas where it so in fact
specified. That is, in these statutes that do not pertain to permit issuance, but where the
legislature obviously felt some kind of judicial process needed to apply, it went ahead
and authorized such, but not by simply reiterating the language of the footnoted statutes.

I

I.C. § 67-6519 - An applicant denied a permit or aggrieved by a decision may within twenty-eight (28)
days after all remedies have been exhausted under local ordinance seek judicial review
under the procedures provided by chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code.
I.C. § 67-6520 - An applicant denied a permit or aggrieved by a decision may within twenty-eight
(28) days after all appellate remedies have been exhausted under local ordinance
seek judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code.
I.C. § 67-6521- An affected person aggrieved by a decision may within twenty-eight (28) days
after all remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances seek judicial
review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code.
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Instead, the legislature specifically provided for a form of judicial process thought
needed, but steered clear of AP A review. This results in showing a conscious effort by
the legislature to limit one's ability to obtain APA review.
As to those remaining statutes of LLUP A that are silent to any type of judicial
verbiage (APA language or otherwise), the legislature was clearly intending that the
subject matter of these statutes would not be subject to judicial review. This clarity stems
from the legislative intent carmon that holds:
Statues that are in pari materia must be construed together to effect
legislative intent. Statutes are in pari materia if they relate to the same
subject. Where a statute with respect to one subject contains a certain
provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute
concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention
existed.
City o/Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 68, 72
P.3d 906,909 (2003) (emphasis added; citations omitted).
The statutes of LLUP A obviously all relate to the same subject matter of land use,
and must therefore be construed together. In doing this, it is first noted that there are the
eight separate statutes pointed to above that reference some form of judicial process. The
omission of "judicial process" language from the remaining statntes of LLUPA, becomes
quite significant as it shows a specific intent by the legislature that is completely opposite
from the intent of the eight "judicial-process/review" statutes. This clearly being that
those provisions of LLUP A that do not contain specified judicial review/process
language were not intended by the legislature to be subject to direct judicial review via
the APA. 2

This said with the understanding that these provisions still may be subject to collateral actions. See Burt v.
City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65 (1983), holding that while a legislative zoning decision is not subject to

2

direct judicial review, it nonetheless may be scrutinized by means of collateral actions such as declaratory

actions.
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This analysis of the legislature's intent is even more firmly cemented in regard to
section 67-6511 because it is one of the eight LLUPA statutes that contain judicialprocess verbiage. Real significance arises from the fact that it is sections 67-6511(a) and
(b) that ultimately provided the basis for the Board's zoning decision that Giltner now
challenges.

Although these two subsections do not contain any judicial verbiage,

paragraph (d) of 67-6511 does, albeit not of the nature that is of any help to Giltner's
present attempt to obtain judicial review. 3 Nevertheless, the fact that such verbiage is in
one of the provisions of 67-6511, but omitted from the remaining three (a, b and c),
causes the above analysis of legislative intent (stemming from City of Sandpoint, supra)
to be focused specifically down to the exact statute at issue.
As indicated, an examination of 67-6511 on its face shows only the last paragraph
of that statute (subsection (d» to contain any judicial verbiage. This reveals that the
legislature, in drafting the whole of 67-6511, surgically inserted such judicial verbiage
into the statute so that it only applied to those limited circumstances stemming from
paragraph (d). Going further, and examining 67-6511 through the application of City of
Sandpoint, supra, it is plain that because no judicial verbiage is contained within the
parameters of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), the legislature simply did not intend any form
of judicial process be available to any circumstances/decisions arising from those three
subsections.
The existing language found in section 67 -6511 (d) becomes even more
problematic for Giltner when its arguments concerning Idaho Code Section 31-1506 are
examined. This is because it (I.e. § 31-1506) holds in pertinent part:

3

I.e. § 67-6511(d) gives a property owner standing in court to enforce the provisions of that subsection.
5

Unless otherwise provided by law, judicial review of any act, order or
proceeding of the board shall be initiated by any person aggrieved thereby
within the same time and in the same maimer as provided in chapter 52,
title 67, Idaho Code, for judicial review of actions.
(I.e. § 31-1506; emphasis added). The emphasized language is the limiting portion of
the statute that controls or determines when the parameters of 31-1506 can be applied.
That is to say, not every single act, order or proceeding of a board can be judicially
reviewed pursuant this 31-1506. Instead, only those actions of the board that do not fall
within the parameters of some other statute that concerns judicial review. It must further
be kept in mind (as analyzed above) that such parameters are capable of extending
beyond the specific statute itself. In some instances (like the one at hand), the judicial
review procedures being "otherwise provided," may be provided by not being provided.
That is, by not including verbiage in a statute that specifically prohibits direct judicial
review, the legislature (under certain circumstances) is in fact intending that the absence
of the verbiage is in fact the prohibition against the statue being subject to such review.
In this regard then, the "non-specifying" statute itself otherwise provides for purposes of
determining 31-1506 applicability.
With the issue at hand, it is clear that LLUPA (and 67-6511 on its own) does

otherwise provide the procedures/requirements for judicial review, as there are several
provisions within the act (and one within the statute itself) that discuss the parameters of
such review.

As discussed above, the absence of such judicial verbiage from the

remaining statutes or provisions of LLUPA, show that they were indirectly being
prohibited from any kind of judicial review or process.

Regardless, whether the

challenged zoning decision is viewed as falling within the parameters of those statutes
that contain specific judicial review language, or those that don't (or the parameters of
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both), the fact remains that judicial review procedures are in fact otherwise provided for
zoning decisions stemming from LLUPA and section 67-6511 specifically. Accordingly,
the limiting language of 31-1506 is triggered and its provisions prevented from being
applied to the Board's zoning decision as argued by Giltner.
In sum, Giltner is simply in error in its implication that LLUPA has only one
judicial review provision, as there are several. Further, Giltner is in error in its claim that
judicial review of zoning decisions is not prohibited by any provision of LL UP A. It is
the very omission of such judicial review language from 67-6511 that in fact prohibits
judicial review of zoning decisions. Because LLUPA does otherwise provide for judicial
review procedures, the limiting language of the very statute that Giltner attempts to reach
the APA with activates and prevents such from being accomplished.
If section 31-1506's applicability to this matter is still questioned, then another
prong of statutory interpretation that should be considered is that which examines
legislative history. To this regard, Idaho courts have held that if a "statute is ambiguous,
then it must be construed to mean what the legislature intended for it to mean. To
determine that intent, we examine ... [among other things, the statute's] legislative history.
City ofSandpoint, supra, 139 Idaho at 68, 72 P.3d at 909.

In examining the history of 31-1506, the Statement of Purpose behind the statute
is first noted. It reads:
The purpose of this bill is to provide for the appeal of county
commissioner decisions in the same manner as judicial review of actions
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), chapter 52, title 67, Idaho
Code.
The current process for appeals is archaic and inconsistent with other
sections of county law. The planning and zoning and medical indigency
appeals are conducted as appeals under the APA.
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The current process of appellate procedure makes the district judge the
fourth or "super" commissioner with the ability to overrule the factual
determinations and judgments of three individuals.
The types of decisions that are appealed are administrative or executive in
nature and the more appropriate method would be to use the AP A. This
method of appeal will protect the rights of those affected by county
commission decisions while giving consideration to county commission
judgments.
S.L. 1993, ch. 103, § 2 (emphasis added). The emphasized language in the second
paragraph shows that the legislature clearly viewed planning and zoning and medical
indigency as established areas of law, separate from those that 31-1506 was intended to
involve. Also evident is the view that the existing plauning and zoning (and medical
indigency) procedures for utilizing the AP A were considered so proficient and well
working that such could serve as an example of how to structure procedures for those
areas oflaw outside planning and zoning. The legislature obviously viewed planning and
zoning as an area of law not in need of strengthening by the 31-1506 provisions. In other
words, there was no recognized deficiency in LLUPA that 31-1506 was intended to fix.
Instead, it was meant to provide relief to those other areas of county law that were in fact
"broken" by not having APA access. Because planning and zoning already did, the
provisions of 31-1506 were not meant to apply to it.
The other areas of law that 31-1506 was designed for are identified in the
emphasized language in the forth paragraph of the cited Statement of Purpose.

This

language states that the "types of decisions that are appealed [pursuant to 31-1506] are
administrative or executive in nature. S.L. 1993, ch. 103, § 2. Zoning decisions under
LLUP A are for the most part legislative, which further demonstrates the intended nonapplicability of 31-1506 to such decisions.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Petitioner's application for judicial review
should be dismissed and the Board's decisions in this matter should be affirmed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

~fMarCh

2010.

~-==
Michael J. Seib
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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